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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over Issue No. 1 pursuant to Utah Code § 
78-2a-3(2)(h). The Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction as to Issues No. 2-4 because of 
Appellant's failure to file a timely notice of appeal as required by Utah R. App. P. 4(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Whether the trial court erred in awarding Appellant $3,000 in attorney 
fees instead of $11,377 as requested by Appellant. (Brief of Appellant ("App't Br."), at 
1). 
Standard of Review: Although presented as a single issue, Ms. Colleli actually takes 
eight exceptions (App't Br. 17-19) to the District Court's ruling. Exceptions 1- 5 and 7 
question the District Court's findings of fact. The Court of Appeals reviews findings of 
fact for clear error (Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, ^ [15, 979 P.2d 338). Furthermore, Ms. 
Colleli must marshal the evidence in favor of the Court's finding (Id.) 
Exception six and eight appear to make the same claim: that the amount of fees 
awarded by the District Court was against Utah law and public policy (App't Br. 18-19). 
The Court of Appeals reviews the amount of the District Court's award of attorney's fees 
for clear abuse of discretion (see, e.g., Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah App. 
1998)). 
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Preserved for appeal: Ms. Colleli has not preserved this issue for appeal. In response 
to this Court's order, Ms. Colleli filed Appellant's Supplement to Brief with Record 
Citations (Supplement). Ms. Colleli claims she properly raised to the issue with the 
District Court, and thus preserved for review, on record pages 380-82 (Supplement, at 2). 
These pages do not demonstrate that Ms. Colleli preserved the specific issues she now 
appeals. 
Issue No. 2: Whether the trial court erred in finding that the parties' previous Nevada 
divorce decree, as amended, did not award Ms. Colleli to further alimony. (App't Br. 2). 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals reviews findings of fact for clear error 
{Young v. Young. 1999 UT 38.1J15, 979 P.2d 338). Furthermore, Ms. Colleli must 
marshal the evidence in favor of the Court's finding (Id) 
Preserved for appeal: Ms. Colleli has not preserved this issue for appeal. Final 
judgment was entered on Feb. 6. 2002; appeal of this issue is untimely. 
Issue No. 3: Whether the trial court erred in ruling the Ms. Colleli is estopped from 
trying to collect her purported alimony because of the passage of time and the order 
having been issued by a Nevada court. (App't Br. 2-3). 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals reviews findings of fact for clear error 
(Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38,1J15, 979 P.2d 338). Furthermore, Ms. Colleli must 
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marshal the evidence in favor of the Court's finding (Id.) The Court of Appeals reviews 
conclusions of law for correctness. 
Preserved for appeal: Ms. Colleli has not preserved this issue for appeal. Final 
judgment was entered on Feb. 6, 2002; appeal of this issue is untimely. 
Issue No. 4: Whether the trial court erred in crediting Mr. Colleli for one-half of the 
parties" childrens' medical expenses. (App't Br. 4). 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals reviews findings of fact for clear error 
(Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38,1[15, 979 P.2d 338). Furthermore, Ms. Colleli must 
marshal the evidence in favor of the Court's finding (Id.) The Court of Appeals reviews a 
trial court's decision regarding child support for a clear abuse of discretion. Jensen v. 
BowcuU 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1995). 
Preserved for appeal: Ms. Colleli has not preserved this issue for appeal. Final 
judgment was entered on May 20. 2003; the appeal of this judgment is untimely. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The parties were married in Utah in 1987, and divorced in Nevada in 1997 (App't 
Br. 6) 
2. Two children were born of this marriage (App't Br. 6). 
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3. On May 21, 1999 the Nevada court ordered that Mr. Colleli take custody of the 
parties" children and suspended Ms. Colleli's rights of visitation (R. 2-4). 
4. On November 13, 2001, Ms. Colleli petitioned the Utah Third District Court for 
modification of the Nevada divorce decree (as modified), seeking statutory visitation and 
a reduction of her child support obligation (R. 6-10). 
5. Pursuant to Ms. Colleli's motion for a temporary order, Mr. Colleli stipulated to, 
and Commissioner Evans recommended, a temporary order granting Ms. Colleli visitation 
and reducing her child support to the $20 statutory minimum (R. 23), Ms. Colleli 
submitted an order (R. 80-83). 
6. The order submitted by Ms. Colleli added that Mr. Colleli was to transport the 
children to and from these visits, which was not a part of the commissioner's ruling or the 
parties' stipulation (R. 80-83). 
7. The part of the order requiring Mr. Colleli to transport the children was set aside 
pursuant to Mr. Colleli's Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion (R. 162). 
8. Mr. Colleli agreed to appropriate visitation and the reduction in child support (R. 
23). 
9. Ms. Colleli continued to insist that the District Court order Mr. Colleli transport the 
children to and from visitation (R. 135-141). 
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10. The District Court appointed a private guardian ad litem (GAL) (R. 164-65). 
11. The GAL recommended that Mr. Colleli should provide transportation when it is 
not feasible to use public transportation or it would significantly cut into allotted 
visitation time (R. 198). 
12. On Jan. 14, 2003 a trial was held on the sole issue of attorney fees (R. 286). 
13. After hearing testimony and argument the District Court ruled that Ms. Colleli 
had financial need, that Mr. Colleli had the ability to pay her fees, and that $3,000 was a 
reasonable amount for attorney fees (R. 286). 
14. The District Court ordered Ms. Colleli to prepare findings, conclusions, and an 
order consistent with its ruling (R. 286). 
15. Ms. Colleli submitted these but the District Court rejected them and wrote its 
own (R. 296-300). 
16. Ms. Colleli filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 59 motion seeking an increase in the award of 
attorney fees R. 380-82). 
17. The District Court denied Ms. Collelfs motion (R. 537). 
18. This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As to Issue No. 1 
Ms. Colleli has failed to demonstrate that this issue was preserved for appeal. Ms. 
Colleli has failed to marshal the evidence to challenge the District Court's ruling. The 
District Court was within its discretion in finding the $3,000 is a reasonable amount. 
As to Issues 2 and 3 
The appeal of the District Court's ruling on Ms. Collelfs order to show cause is 
untimely. Ms. Colleli has failed to marshal the evidence to challenge the District Court's 
ruling. The District Court correctly found the previous alimony provision ambiguous. The 
District Court correctly that Ms. Colleli's attempt to enforce the ostensible alimony was 
untimely. Ms. Colleli's actions demonstrate that she did not believe that alimony was due 
to her. 
As to Issue 4 
The appeal of the District Court's ruling granting Mr. Colleli credit for child medical 
expenses is untimely. Ms. Colleli has failed to marshal the evidence to challenge the 
District Court's ruling. The District Court was within its discretion to award this credit. 
ARGUMENT 
10 
I. Issue No. 1: The District Court Was Within Its Discretion When it Awarded 
Ms. Colleli $3,000 in Attorney's Fees 
Despite Ms. Colleli's lengthy argument and factual misrepresentations, there is really 
only one question in an appeal of an award of Attorney's fees; was the District Court 
within the scope of its discretion in making the award? Here, the District Court was and 
this Court should affirm. 
The District Court took argument on the attorney fee issue at least three different times 
(at trial in Ms. Colleli's Rule 59 memorandum, and at the Rule 59 hearing). The District 
Court explained, on the record, three times why it felt its award was reasonable (at trial in 
its findings and conclusions subsequent to the trial and in the Rule 59 hearing). Ms. 
Colleli's appeal on this issue is frivolous; she misrepresents the District Court's actions 
on this matter, misrepresents the law, fails to marshal the evidence, and fails to show that 
the District Court abused its discretion. 
A. Dawn Colleli has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the District 
Court's factual findings 
Ms. Colleli challenges the District Court's factual findings regarding its award of 
reasonable attorney fees1 (App't Br., 17-19). Ms. Colleli identifies eight sub issues in her 
1 The District Court did not reduce Ms. Colleli's attorney fees, as Ms. Colleli claims, 
rather it granted judgment against Mr. Colleli for less than Ms. Colleli requested. The 
amount that Ms. Colleli's counsel is entitled to from his client is not at issue. 
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brief (Id), Of those eight, six (1-5 and 7) challenge the District Court's factual findings. 
"A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 12(a)(9). 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must 
extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's 
position. In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger 
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient 
to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is 
clearly erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). After 
conceding that "Ms. Colleli is aware that she must marshal all of the evidence in the 
record that could possibly support the trial court's reduction of attorney fees[,]" (App't 
Br. 20) she fails to marshal any facts in support of the District Court's finding. Ms. 
Colleli's brief is bulging with evidentiary assertions, which she claims supports her 
appeal. But, there is not one speck of evidence in Ms. Colleli's brief that supports the 
District Court's findings, she simply reargues the evidence that she believes supports her 
position. 
One fact illustrates both that the District Court had support for its findings, and that 
Ms. Colleli has rejected her responsibility to marshal the facts for this Court: Concurrent 
with her petition to modify the divorce decree, Ms. Colleli filed a motion for a temporary 
order (R. 17-23), which requested the same relief as her petition (i.e. reduced child 
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support and statutory visitation). At the hearing on that motion, before Commissioner 
Evans, Mr. Colleli stipulated to every issue Ms. Colleli raised in her petition to modify, as 
well as other issues (R. 23-24). Far from being intransigent, Mr. Colleli readily agreed to 
Ms. Colleli's requests. Not only is Mr. Colleli's cooperation unmentioned in Ms. Colleli's 
brief, Ms. Colleli actually argues that Mr. Colleli was intransigent. In a similar case, 
where the only evidence provided supported appellant's claim of error this Court said: 
When an appellant fails to meet the heavy burden of marshaling the evidence, we 
assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court. Here, [Appellant] simply 
re-argued his own evidence. Accordingly, because [Appellant] has failed to marshal 
the evidence supporting the trial court's findings and then to show that the findings are 
unsupported, we affirm the trial court's construction of the ambiguous alimony 
provisions of the divorce decree." 
Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, f24, 973 P.2d 431. Not only does Ms. Colleli fail to 
marshal the evidence, she often misrepresents the evidence and proceedings. For 
example, Ms. Colleli states "The two issues raised in Ms. Colleli's petition were narrow 
but substantially important: (a) statutory parenting time; and (b) the amount of child 
support. However, the path to trial and judgment was unexpectedly tortuous, lengthy, and 
expensive. Since the trial court entered judgment in favor of Ms. Colleli, those issues are 
not challenged on appeal." (App't Br. 8-9). While this implies a difficult battle ending in 
victory and finally allowing Ms. Colleli visitation and reducing her child support 
obligation, the truth is there was no battle over either of these issues. Mr. Colleli 
stipulated to both visitation and reduced child support in front of Commissioner Evans on 
Dec. 3, 2001, less than a month after Ms. Colleli filed her petition to modify. 
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This Court has "shown no reluctance to affirm when the appellant fails to adequately 
marshal the evidence" West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1313 (Utah 
App. 1991) and it should, with no reluctance, affirm here. 
B. The District Court was within its discretion in fixing the amount of 
reasonable attorney fees 
Utah courts have always recognized that some issues, such as the discretionary award 
of attorney's fees in divorce cases, are best left to the trial court. Because of this, our 
appellate courts review such awards for abuse of discretion: 
The trial court necessarily has broad discretion in determining the amount of a 
reasonable attorney fee and will not be reversed unless the court abuses its discretion. 
The trial court's discretion arises from the fact that it is in a better position than an 
appellate court to gauge the quality and efficiency of the representation and the 
complexity of the litigation. 
Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 380 (Utah 1996). See also 
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991) "Both the decision to award 
attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within the sound discretion of the trial 
court." 
The appellate courts have given guidance on what issues the trial courts need to 
consider as they exercise that discretion: 
In determining the reasonableness of attorney fees, the court may consider the 
difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the 
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged 
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in the locality for similar services, the amount involved in the case and the result 
attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved/' 
Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah App. 1992). Muir, in addition to providing 
guidance on what issues are appropriate for the trial court to consider, also requires the 
District Court to make findings as to the reasonableness of its award fees. In its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, the District Court makes detailed findings regarding, inter 
alia, the narrowness of the issues, the fact that substantial agreement was reached early in 
the proceedings, the fact that much of Ms. Colleli's fees were for investigating Mr. 
Colleli's finances, the limited assets the parties, and the results produced. (See R. 299-
300, THI17-23; R. 589-90; R. 62 L Transcript at 3, linelO through Transcript at 6, line 10). 
In a hearing on Ms. Colleli's Utah R. Civ. P. 59 motion to increase the attorney fee 
award, the District Court said that the only substantive dispute (transportation) was 
narrow, uncomplicated, and discreet with 'Very limited facts that would be of assistance 
to the Court in deciding it." (Transcript of Rule 59 hearing, R. 621, at 4). In other words, 
the only issue remaining after the temporary order hearing was Ms. Colleli's insistence 
that Mr. Colleli personally transport the children to their visitation with her, and that issue 
was not fact intensive. 
The District Court's findings of fact adequately support its conclusion that $3,000 is a 
reasonable attorney's fee. and this Court should affirm that ruling. 
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II. Issues No. 2&3: The District Court Properly Found That Ms. Colleli Was 
Not Entitled To Alimony From Her Previous Decree 
Issues two and three surround the District Court's denial of an order to show cause for 
a judgment of supposed alimony. The District Court found that the provision of the 
parties' Nevada divorce decree (as modified) regarding alimony was at best ambiguous 
and held that because of Ms. Colleli's failure to attempt clarification from the Nevada 
court, or seek collection, for three years she is estopped2 from arguing it now in a Utah 
court. Besides failing to marshal the evidence (e.g., the record on appeal does not include 
a transcript of the Jan. 15, 2002 hearing on this action before Commissioner Evans), Ms. 
Colleli has waived this issue by not appealing it in a timely manner. 
A, The District Court's order denying Ms. Colleli's motion for order to show 
cause was final in 2002, thus its appeal now is untimely 
Issues two and three of Ms. Colleli's appeal regard the denial of her motion for an 
order to show cause (App't Br. 2-3). This motion (''Alimony OSC) sought an $18,000 
judgment and an order of contempt against Mr. Colleli for failing to pay alimony pursuant 
to the decree of the Nevada court (R. 25-26). 
On Jan. 15, 2002, Commissioner Evans held a hearing on Alimony OSC and 
recommended that Ms. Colleli's motion be denied (R. 84). Ms. Colleli objected to the 
2 Ms. Colleli claims that the District Court relied on laches, but neither the 
16 
commissioner's recommendations (R. at 91). The District Court adopted the 
commissioner's recommendations and finally disposed of the matter in a signed order on 
Feb. 6, 2002 (R. 113-114). 
In all cases, post-judgment orders - such as Ms. Collelfs Alimony OSC - can be final 
for purposes of appeal: "Post judgment orders are independently subject to the 
requirement of finality, according to their own substance and effect." Independent 
Funding, Inc. v. Wynn Co., Inc., 2002 UT App 153, [^2, 47 P.3d 932. 
In Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982), the court addressed whether an order 
issued post-judgment, requiring one party to sign certain sales documents, in order to 
dispose of property as the court had previously ordered, was a final order. The court 
began by giving an example of a non-final and therefore non-appealable, order as one 
vacating a garnishment because that order left the "controversy open for future 
determination." (Id. at 142). "In contrast," the court goes on to say, "the effect of the 
order requiring appellant to convey the disputed property in this case was to determine 
substantial rights in the disputed property and to terminate finally the litigation 
surrounding its sale." Id. The court went on to find that the order was final and 
appealable. 
commissioner's minute entry, nor the District Court's final order mentions laches at all. 
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As in Cahoon, the trial court here considered and finally determined the substantial 
rights of Ms. Colleli (to receive alimony) and terminated her litigation to collect it. In 
signing that order and entering it on the record, the District Court finally disposed of Ms. 
Colleli's action for enforcement of the putative alimony award. The order was a final 
judgment, disposing of all claims of all parties as to that action. 
Because, in divorce cases, the District Court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to 
UCA § 30-3-5, "several orders in a single divorce proceeding may be final and 
appealable." Copier v. Copier, 939 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah App. 1997). 
In State ex rel B.B., 2002 UT App 82, 45 P.3d 527, this Court found an order to be 
final because, as in this case, it "resolved the controversy between the parties as raised in 
the Order to Show Cause..." (Id. 1f8). 
Ms. Colleli's behavior subsequent to the Feb. 6. 2002 order belies her claim that the 
order was interlocutory. For instance, Ms. Colleli asserts that she "prevailed in every 
aspect of her petition." (App't Br. 21) See also R. 317: "Petitioner fully prevailed." If Ms. 
Colleli's Alimony OSC was part of her petition, she could not truthfully make such a 
statement, because she did not prevail on the alimony issue.3 As another example, in her 
17-page memorandum supporting her motion to amend judgment (Rule 59 Motion) (R. 
307-322), Ms. Colleli vituperatively argues to the District Court to change its award of 
3 The same principle applies as to Ms. Colleli's fourth issue, discussed 
infra. 
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attorney fees, but fails to mention any issue with the alimony order. Likewise, the Court 
minutes of the bench trial on the petition to modify (R. 286) makes no mention of 
alimony, Ms. Colleli's proposed findings and conclusions on her petition to modify (R. 
287-92) makes no mention of alimony, Ms. Colleli's proposed final order on her petition 
to modify (R. 293-95) makes no mention of alimony, the District Court's findings and 
conclusions on Ms. Colleli's petition to modify7 (R. 296-301) makes no mention of 
alimony, the District Court's Final Order and Judgment on Ms. Colleli's petition to 
modify (R. 302-04)(prepared by Ms. Colleli) makes no mention of alimony. 
The reason these documents do not mention alimony is because the issue was finally 
settled in February of 2002. 
When the District Court issued its final order on Alimony OSC, on Feb. 6, 2002, it was 
appealable. The time to appeal it had long since lapsed when Ms. Colleli filed her notice 
of appeal on Aug. 13, 2003, therefore the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to consider 
Ms. Colleli's appeal as it relates to that order. 
B. There is no factual overlap between Ms. Colleli's Petition to Modify and her 
Order to Show Cause 
Ms. Colleli's petition to modify sought to change the divorce decree to allow her 
parent time and reduce her child support obligations (R. 6 et seq). The questions before 
the District Court on her petition were: 1) had the circumstances, which caused the 
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Nevada court to suspend her visitation privileges, changed so as to allow her to resume 
visitation? And, 2) what did the law allow as far as child support payments? 
Ms. Coheirs order to show cause sought to enforce a supposed alimony provision of 
the existing divorce decree. The questions before the District Court on her order to show 
cause were: 1) Does the decree order alimony payments? And, 2) If so, is Mr. Colleli in 
contempt for not paying those payments? 
The only commonality in these two actions is they both involve the same parties and 
they both involve the same divorce decree, one action seeking to modify it, and the other 
seeking to enforce it. Final judgment in one action does not affect, in any way, final 
judgment on the other. The issues are not related, the District Court's Feb. 6, 2002 order 
finally disposed of Ms. Colleli's action to enforce her claimed right to alimony. 
Consequently, her right to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court and appeal the District 
Court's order expired in early March of 2002, long before her notice of appeal. 
C. The order denying Ms. Colleli's order to show cause was not interlocutory, 
and is not therefore, included in her Notice of Appeal 
Ms. Colleli's notice of appeal seeks appeal of the District Court's July 16, 2003 order 
"including all interlocutory orders entered on or before such date.'1 (R. 592). In spite of 
this, issues two and three of her brief challenge the District Court's Feb. 6, 2002 order 
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denying her order to show cause. This order to show cause was not interlocutory to her 
petition to modify. 
Interlocutory means ^provisional; interim; temporary; not final." Black's Law 
Dictionary 731 (5th Ed. 1979). None of these words describes the District Court's Feb. 6, 
2002 order. That order concluded Ms. Colleli's action to enforce the supposed alimony 
award. It was not provisional, not interim, and not temporary, it was a final order with 
nothing reserved for further adjudication. 
D. The District Court correctly interpreted the prior decree as to alimony 
In a Feb. 9. 1999 stipulated order modifying the parties' divorce decree, the Nevada 
court said: "1 . [Ralph ColleliJ shall pay to [Dawn Collcli] the sum of $600 per month, of 
which all sums in excess of the statutory child support and any payment on arrearages 
shall be deemed alimony. At this time, ongoing child support is $482.00, payment on 
arrearages is $50.00 and alimony is $68.00." (R. 29)(emphasis added) (ulst Nev. Order"). 
In a May 2L 1999 order modifying the parties' divorce decree, the Nevada court 
stripped Ms. Colleli of custody of their children, awarded Mr. Colleli sole custody and 
suspended Ms. Colleli's right to visitation (R. 2-4)(u2nd Nev. Order"). The Nevada court 
further ordered Ms. Colleli to pay not less than $100 per month per child to Mr. Colleli 
(R. 3). 2nd Nev, Order is silent on Ms. Colleli's right to alimony. 
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Ms. Colleli now claims that the 1st Nev. Order entitled her to $600 per month of 
alimony, regardless of child support, and that all the 2nd Nev. Order did was change the 
custody situation. The documents themselves do not support such an unusual conclusion. 
In 1st Nev. Order, the court wiped the alimony slate clean ("All arrearages in alimony 
are waived..." R. 29). 1st Nev. Order establishes a $600 baseline monthly obligation due 
to Ms. Colleli using the statutory child support amount, then added a $50 assessment for 
arrearages, and "deemed"' the remainder to be alimony, in other words to treat the 
remainder as if it were alimony. The Nevada court's expression suggests that it felt that 
an amount child support greater than the statutory child support guidelines was proper and 
this "deem[ing]" was how it got past the statutory limits. 
To illustrate: what if the Nevada statutory child support obligations were raised by 
$50? Would Mr. Colleli be required to pay $650 (without further action from the Nevada 
court), or would the amount "deemed'' to be alimony be reduced thereby keeping Mr. 
Colieli's obligation at $600 per month? By setting a fixed amount in excess of the statute, 
but anchoring the application of that $600 to the statute fixing child support, the court 
identified the money as child support. Its deeming the remainder something else allowed 
it to get around the statute's limits but was not a substantive label. 
When the Nevada court later removed the children from Ms. Colieli's custody and 
ordered Ms. Colleli to pay child support to Mr. Colleli, but did not spell out any new 
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arrangement allowing Ms. Colleli alimony, the court's silence implied dial n nu lunger 
needed to "deem" anything alimony, that alimony was a legal fiction to increase child 
support. Had the Nevada court meant to continue Ms. Colleli's "alimony" it would have 
allowed lier lo seloft'the .immihi -.lin Lid U» \\\\ ai'diitsl l'k; itm« mnl Mr ('ulk-li \\ on In I 
have owed her, it did not do so. 
ilK I \ "Is ('olleli " ; iiclioii,1 • demonstrate that she understood that no alimony was 
owed to her 
1 he District Court fi irther ruled tl: lat because oi \K • ,»i,^(l s taiiure to collect the 
si ipposed alii i 101 in • she was i low estopped from -^ * , Colli;:;! argi les a 
line of cases saying that failure to collect alimony does not provide a laches defense to 
later collection. The laches argument is a straw man, there is no citation to the record to 
show that the District Court even considered a laches defense in its rulmg. I-ven if it had, 
this case is different I 'irst, tl le alii i 101 P 7 pi o » ' ision is at '''best, ambiguoi is. and. i noi e 
probably just not there at all, and that was the District Court's primary finding. Second, 
Ms. Colleli had the opportunity to address this in the Nevada courts, but did not -- what 
she is doing now is essentially a collateral attack on the Nevada decree in a Utah court. 
1 1: in d , by failing to seek w hat si le l io\ v e'laii i is is 1 le i s i n itil tl iree y ears latet and if I a 
different state, she was denying Mr. Colleli the right to seek timely clarification from tlle 
Nevada court, thus working a serious prejudice to Mr. Colleli. 
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By sitting on her supposed right to alimony until it was too late and too far away to 
properly resolve the dispute, Ms. Colleli has waived the right to assert it Furthermore, 
she does not make this argument with clean hands: she claims an entitlement to $600 per 
month as alimony even though the 1st Nev. Order udeemed" only $68 per month to be 
alimony. To claim that it would be equitable for her to continue to collect the full $600 
even though custody, and with it the child support the child support the Nevada court had 
ordered, had been taken from her, is inappropriate. Ms. Coheirs late-in-the-day attempt 
to hold $18,000 over Mr. Coheirs head was properly denied and this Court should affirm. 
F. This Court cannot properly consider the findings of the District Court 
because Ms. Colleli has not made a transcript of the Jan. 15, 2002 hearing on 
this action a part of the record on appeal 
Ms. Colleli seeks to reverse the District Court's findings and its conclusion, but she 
fails to provide a transcript of the hearing before Commissioner Evans in this action. 
Without a record, it is impossible for this Court to review the District Court's factual 
considerations and legal analysis. For instance, Ms. Colleli claims that a laches defense is 
not appropriate, but never shows that the District Court considered a laches defense (no 
court document in the record on appeal mentions laches, there is no indication that the 
court considered it). Also, did the District Court consider extraneous evidence at the 
hearing? Was the District Court's ruling based on factual findings or made as a matter of 
law? 
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Without a transcript of that hearing, these questions cat n tot be re \ iew ed It v > as IS Is. 
Colleli 's responsibility, as the party charging error, to provide a complete record, having 
failed to do so the Court should assume that the District Court ruled correctly and affirm. 
In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, this Court can only assume the 
regularity of the proceedings below. Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate 
review have the duty and responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate 
record. '"Absent that record defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral 
allegation which the review court has no power to determine. This Court simply cannot 
rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts iinsupported by the 
record.1" 
State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993)(citation omitted, emphasis m •>» ii i ir^ 
I 8-vsiii ie Distr ict C o u r t W a s Within i ts Discretion In Allowing M r . 
Collel i 's Medical Expenses 
Mi i olicii tiled a motion ! >i m order to show cause to obtain a judgment for unpaid 
thilil support ,'iP'1 I'*1"'MH'-hall ('"( I|IHH;I|II< INUIUMI expenses IK incurred loi Hit parties' 
children (R. 395 et seq.) The District Court granted this motion and entered judenteni ,\ , 
with her allegations on Alimony OSC, supra, Ms. Colleli has failed to marshal the 
evidence, she has failed to timely appeal the final order of the District Court, and she has 
failed to pi ovide tl lis Coi n I; witl I a transcript of tl ie 1: learii lg foi tl ie Coi n I: of Appeals to 
review (App' t Br. 47 . n21 makes assertions about the 1 ie< irii ig, wl licl i a u in not b e » 'ei ified 
because no transcript was included in the record). 
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A. The issue of the District Court's order allowing medical expenses is not 
properly before the Court because it was not interlocutory and was not timely 
appealed 
Issue four (App't Br. 3) deals with a final judgment entered by the District Court on 
May, 20, 2003. That order granted Mr. Colleli, inter alia, a judgment against Ms. Colleli 
for one-half of medical expenses of the parties' children. 
As with issues two and three, supra, this issue is not part of the final judgment of the 
District Court on Ms. Colleli's petition for modification, it is for a final judgment granted 
pursuant to Mr. Colleli*s order to show cause. As such, the timeliness and finality 
arguments raised in sections II.A-ILC, supra, are applicable here. 
Ms. Colleli argues that the District Court made a "choice of law" ruling, but there is no 
indication in the record that the District Court did so rule. The District Court's order 
simply grants judgment. 
Furthermore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these expenses, 
despite Mr. Colleli not timely providing copies to Ms. Colleli as required in Utah Code § 
78-45-7.15(8). Ms. Colleli argues that, even though the divorce decree was issued in 
Nevada, Mr. Colleli had constructive knowledge of Utah law, and his obligation to 
comply with it, as soon as he crossed the border into our state. Therefore, his failure to 
comply with Utah law and give Ms. Colleli notice and verification within 30 days meant 
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that he was barred from collecting the amounts due pursuant to his i lecree. This 
uncharitable argument is also unhelpful, and the issue is simply resolved: Utah Code § 
78-45-7.15(9) says, "a parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to 
receive credit" (ei nphasis added) foi fallii ig to pi o1 'ide notice. "May" is permissive, not 
mandatory; it means the Court can deny, not that it must deny. 
This Coi n t's i II lpublisl led memorandi 11 i 1 decisioi 1 in Larsen v. Larsen, 2003 ( I I ' Vpp 
408 (Addendum I of tins brief I is cliivt/lh on point 
By using the term "may," subsection 8 [since renumbered as subsection 9] of the 
statute gives the trial court discretion to grant or deny credit to a parent who incurred 
medical expenses based on that parent's compliance with subsection 7. Further, Wife 
submitted, and served on Husband, a verification of costs. Although the verification of 
costs was not submitted within the statutory time period, we determine that the trial court 
in this case did not abuse its discretion and therefore uphold the trial court's order 
regarding medical and dental expenses. 
hi It is true that the District Court could have denied Mr. Colleli's expenses, the 
question is did flu ! >istriet Coml /i,n« in dvm I hose benefits? As Larsen makes clear, it 
did not have to deny, and so the District Coi irt w as wit! lii I its discretion to a^  var :I tl le n I. 
Fi II thermore, this Court, in Larsen, reiterated the proper standard of review, saying "A 
trial coi ill's decision regarding cl lild si lppoi t w ill i IC t be disti n bed absei it ;i i lai life st 
injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of... discretion."' See Jensen v. Bow cut, 
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892 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah App. 1995). There is no manifest injustice or inequity, the 
District Court's ruling should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Colleli's appeal is frivolous, of her four issues only the first is even properly 
before the Court of Appeals. And, in that one issue, Ms. Colleli blatantly fails in her duty 
to marshal the evidence, a duty she admits she has. Furthermore, her brief is burdensome, 
immaterial in most respects, irrelevant in most respects, and not presented with accuracy. 
It appears that this appeal is presented to harass Mr. Colleli by needlessly increasing the 
cost of litigation, a cost that Ms. Colleli clearly expects Mr. Colleli to pay for both sides. 
Mr. Colleli moves this Court for sanctions pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 33, 40(a), and 40(b). Mr. Colleli further asks that this Court affirm the District 
Court, award Mr. Colleli costs and attorney's fees, and remand to the District Court for a 
determination of appropriate amount of that award. 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
;
 1 1 crr> Larsen (Husband) appeals from the trial 
court's judgment on an Order to Show Cause initiated 
by Connie Larsen (Wife). Wc affirm. 
First, Husband argues that the trial court erred 
because it did not rule on his timely objection to the 
proposed order. Husband does not adequately brief 
this issue because his argument contains no citations 
to case law or statutory authority, as required by Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9). Nonetheless, 
because it may affect jurisdiction, we address the 
argument. 
In May 2001, Wife initiated an Order to Show 
Cause, stating that Husband had refused to pay his 
share of the parties' children's nonroutine medical 
and dental expenses, as required by the parties' 
divorce decree. A hearing was held on the Order to 
Show Cause on June 29, 2001. On Septembei 10, 
2001, Husband's Objection to Proposed Order was 
filed. [FN1] Then, approximately three weeks later, 
on October 1, 2001, the trial court entered the signed 
Order on the Order to Show Cause into the record. 
FNL Wife's Proposed Order on Order to 
Show Cause does not appear in the record 
This court has noted that where a party's objections 
fo a proposed order were before the court, yet the 
court entered an order without expressly ruling on the 
objections, the court implicitly denied the objections. 
See Morgan v. Morgan. 875 P.2d 563, 564 n. 1 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994). Similarly, we believe the trial court in 
this case implicitly denied Husband's objections 
because they were before the trial court for 
approximately three weeks before the court signed 
the proposed order. Therefore, Husband's argument 
fails and we turn our attention to the merits of his 
appeal. 
Husband argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it required him to reimburse Wife for 
50% of nonroutine medical and dental expenses she 
incurred on behalf of the parties' children. The 
parties' divorce decree includes a provision making 
each parent responsible for 50% of these costs. In 
addition to this provision, according to statute, each 
parent is "to share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses ... incurred 
for the dependent children." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45-7.15(5) (1995). [FN2] The statute also states that 
the "parent who incurs medical expenses shall 
provide written verification of the cost and payment 
of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 
days of payment." Id. S 78-45-7.15(7). Further, "a 
parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the 
right to ... recover the other parent's share of the 
expenses if that parent fails to comply" with 
subsection 7 Id. § 78-45-7.15(8) (emphasis added). 
FN2. We cite to the 1995 version of Utah 
Code Annotated section 78-45-7.15 because 
it was the statute in effect when the divorce 
decree was entered in February 1996 
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Husband argues that because Wife did not provide 
him with verification of the expenses, pursuant to 
subsection 7, the trial court abused its discretion 
when it awarded Wife the expenses. This court 
reviews questions regarding child support under an 
abuse of discretion standard. See Jensen v. Bowcut, 
892 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah Ct.App.1995) ("A trial 
court's decision regarding child support will not be 
disturbed absent 'manifest injustice or inequity that 
indicates a clear abuse of... discretion.' " (alteration 
in original) (citation omitted)). By using the term 
"may," subsection 8 of the statute gives the trial court 
discretion to grant or deny credit to a parent who 
incurred medical expenses based on that parent's 
compliance with subsection 7. Further, Wife 
submitted, and served on Husband, a verification of 
costs. Although the verification of costs was not 
submitted within the statutory time period, we 
determine that the trial court in this case did not 
abuse its discretion and therefore uphold the trial 
court's order regarding medical and dental expenses. 
*2 Husband next argues that the trial court erred 
when it denied him an award for 50% of insurance 
premiums he paid on behalf of the children. 
However, the trial court correctly stated that this 
issue was not before it, as no motions were filed on 
the issue. TFN3] 
FN3. Parties must properly raise issues 
before the trial court. "A trial court has the 
opportunity to rule if the following three 
requirements are met: (1) 'the issue must be 
raised in a timely fashion;' (2) 'the issue 
must be specifically raised;' and (3) a party 
must introduce 'supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority.' " Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844. 847 
(Utah 1998) (citations omitted). 
Finally, Husband argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion when it awarded Wife 50% of her 
attorney fees. "In an action to enforce the provisions 
of a divorce decree, an award of attorney fees is 
based solely upon the trial court's discretion, 
regardless of the financial need of the moving party." 
Lynzle v. Lvngle. 831 P.2d 1027. 1030 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992) (footnote omitted). The trial court in 
this case stated that, although Wife did not prevail 
entirely upon her claim, she was entitled to an award 
of 50% of her attorney fees because the Order to 
Show Cause was necessary to enforce an ambiguous 
provision in the divorce decree. Therefore, the trial 
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court did not abuse its discretion in its award to Wife. 
Additionally, Wife requests attorney fees on appeal. 
"Generally, when the trial court awards fees in a 
domestic action to the party who then substantially 
prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that 
party on appeal." Id at 1031. Accordingly, Wife is 
entitled to attorney fees on appeal, and we remand to 
the trial court for determination of reasonable fees 
incurred. 
WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, Presiding 
Judge and JUDITH M. BILLINGS. Associate 
Presiding Judge. 
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